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Abstract
Background: The nature of the relationship between a clinical investigator and a research subject
has generated considerable debate because the investigator occupies two distinct roles: clinician
and scientist. As a clinician, the investigator has duties to provide the patient with optimal care and
undivided loyalty. As a scientist, the investigator has duties to follow the rules, procedures and
methods described in the protocol.
Results and conclusion: In this article, I present a contextual approach to the investigator-
subject relationship. The extent of the investigator's duty to provide the patient/subject with clinical
care can vary from one situation to the next, as a function of several factors, including: the research
design, benefits and risks of the research; the subject's reasonable expectations, motivations, and
vulnerabilities; the investigator's ability to benefit the subject; and the investigator's prior
relationship with the subject. These and other factors need to be considered when determining the
clinical investigator's obligations to provide clinical care to human research subjects. In some
research contexts, the investigator has extensive clinical obligations to the patient/subject; in
others, the investigator has minimal ones.
Background
What is the nature of the relationship between a clinical
investigatora and a human research subject? This topic has
been a central concern in many controversies related to
clinical research, including the use of placebo control
groups, randomization, stopping clinical trials early, post-
trial access to medications, informing subjects about inci-
dental findings, provision of ancillary care, medication
wash-out periods, and many others [1-21]. It has also
taken center stage in some prominent legal cases, such as
Moore v. Regents of the University of California [22], Grimes
v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc [23] and Greenberg v. Miami
Children's Hospital Research Institute [24].
The nature of the relationship between a clinical investi-
gator and a research subject has generated considerable
debate because the investigator occupies two distinct
roles: clinician and scientist [10]. As a clinician, the inves-
tigator has duties to provide the patient with optimal care
and undivided loyalty. As a scientist, the investigator has
duties to follow the rules, procedures, and methods
described in the protocol. These distinct obligations may
sometimes conflict when investigators are conducting
clinical research.
For several decades, the fiduciary approach has been an
influential view of the clinical investigator-subject rela-
tionship. According to this view, if an investigator's scien-
tific duties conflict with obligations to provide the patient
with optimal care, obligations to the patient/subject
should prevail, because the investigator, as a fiduciary,
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should not place other interests above those of the patient
[2,4,25,26].
Millerb and Brody [6,7,16] and several other writers have
criticized the fiduciary view [9,13]. While critics agree that
investigators are not obligated to provide their patients/
subjects with optimal care, they disagree about how much
care investigators owe their patients/subjects. At one
extreme, Miller and Brody [6,7,16] argue that investiga-
tors have minimal obligations to provide medical therapy
to patients/subjects beyond what is required by the proto-
col or to protect patients from harm; at the other extreme,
Richardson and Belsky [9] argue that investigators can
have extensive obligations to provided beneficial therapy
to patients/subjects.
In this article, I will present a contextual approach to the
investigator-subject relationship. I will argue that the
extent of the investigator's obligations to provide clinical
care to the patient/subject can vary from one situation to
the next. In some research contexts, the investigator has an
obligation to provide the patient/subject with optimal
care; in others, the investigator has only an obligation to
provide the patient/subject with the care available under
the protocol. There are also variations between these two
extremes.
Preliminary remarks on ethics and the law
The relationship between a clinical investigator and a
research subject has ethical and legal dimensions [27].
While this paper will focus on ethical aspects of the inves-
tigator-subject relationship, the conclusions drawn herein
could have ramifications for the law, because ethical argu-
ments, distinctions, and considerations often influence
legislation, administrative rule-making, and legal deci-
sions [28,29]. For example, growing concerns about ethi-
cal abuses in research with human subjects, such as the
infamous Tuskegee Syphilis Study, led to the passage of
the National Research Act [30], which authorized federal
agencies to codify regulations for the protection of human
research subjects, and led to the appointment of a
national commission to examine the ethics of research
with human subjects. This commission drafted the Bel-
mont Report, which provided a conceptual foundation for
major revisions of the federal research regulations in 1981
[31]. Ethical considerations have also played an impor-
tant role in legal cases concerning research with human
subjects [13,32]. In In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation, the
court referred to the importance of the Nuremberg Code
as an ethical standard for research, especially the code's
emphasis on informed consent [33]. In Grimes v. Kennedy
Krieger Institute, Inc., the court also mentioned the signifi-
cance of the Nuremberg Code as a guide for research with
human subjects and referred to it as part of the interna-
tional common law [23].
Historical perspective
To better understand the fiduciary view of the investiga-
tor-subject relationship, it will be useful place it in an his-
torical context. Two distinct ideas relating to human
research ethics came to fruition in the 1970s. The first idea
emerged as a response to various abuses of human sub-
jects, such as the Nazi experiments on concentration camp
prisoners, the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, the Willowbrook
Hepatitis Experiments, and other infamous cases [34,35].
As a reaction to these abuses, scholars and scientists
argued that the rights, welfare, and dignity of research sub-
jects must be vigorously protected, and policymakers
enacted laws and regulations that reflected this consensus.
The emerging zeitgeist emphasized the importance of pro-
tecting the rights and welfare of the patient/subject and
was deeply skeptical of utilitarian perspectives on research
[36-39]. A version of the Helsinki Declaration adopted in
1975 gave a clear statement of this viewpoint: "In research
on man, the interest of science and society should never
take precedence over considerations related to the well-
being of the subject" [40]. The most recent version of the
Declaration contains a similar statement [41].
The second idea emerged in response to growing ethical
and philosophical tensions between medical research and
practice. In 1979, the authors of the Belmont Report drew a
distinction between research and practice in order to
decide which activities needed to be reviewed for the pro-
tection of human subjects [42]. Clinical research activities
were thought to require a layer of review over and above
the professional peer review that occurs in medicine [43].
The authors also recognized that research and practice
often take place concurrently and that sometimes innova-
tive therapies are described as "experimental."
The  Belmont Report defined research as an activity
"designed to test an hypothesis, permit conclusions to be
drawn, and thereby to develop or contribute to generaliz-
able knowledge," and defined practice as an activity
"designed solely to enhance the well-being of an individ-
ual patient or client" [[42] at p 5]. This definition of
research has substantially influenced the development of
law and policy around the world. When research and
practice occur concurrently, as in a clinical trial, the activ-
ity should be reviewed as research, to ensure that human
subjects receive adequate protections. Innovative thera-
pies need not be classified as research, according to the
Report, so long as they are designed solely to benefit the
patient.
Equipoise and the fiduciary approach
These two influential ideas collided when scholars
became concerned that, while clinical research and clini-
cal practice are conceptually distinct activities, the rights
and welfare of patients participating in clinical are some-Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:16 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/16
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times compromised in randomized clinical trials (RCTs).
In placebo-controlled RCTs subjects are randomly
assigned to receive the experimental treatment or a pla-
cebo. Subjects in the placebo group receive an inert, med-
ically ineffective treatment for their condition, whereas
subjects in the experimental group receive a therapy
thought to be medically effective. A clinical investigator
who enrolls patients into a placebo-controlled RCT there-
fore faces a conflict between his duty, qua scientist, to fol-
low the experimental protocol and his duty, qua
physician, to provide optimal care for his patients. Even
when the RCT does not include a placebo control group,
random assignment to a particular treatment group raises
ethical concerns, because subjects may have reasons to
prefer one treatment to another [20]. For example, in an
RCT comparing lumpectomy to mastectomy for breast
cancer treatment, many women may prefer the lumpec-
tomy because it less disfiguring than a mastectomy [44].
Fried proposed the concept of clinical equipoise as a way
of dealing with some of the dilemmas posed by RCTs [25].
An investigator can enroll a research subject in an RCT
only if the different treatment groups in the RCT are in
equipoise, i.e. there is genuine uncertainty about the rela-
tive merits of different treatments. When there is a therapy
that has been proven to be effective, patients/subjects may
receive an effective therapy or an experimental therapy
thought to be effective [15]. Subjects can receive a placebo
only if it is not known whether there is any therapy that is
better than a placebo. If there is a therapy that has been
proven to be effective, then a clinical investigator cannot
enroll a patient/subject in an RCT with a placebo control
group, because the investigator would be violating his
duty to provide optimal medical care to the patient/sub-
ject [15].
Fried also articulated a neo-Kantian ethical justification
for the doctrine of equipoise. According to Fried, patients/
subjects should not be treated as mere instruments to
achieve scientific or other goals [3,15,25]. Since the time
of Hippocrates physicians and other health care profes-
sionals have subscribed to an ethic that requires one to
protect patients from harm and promote their interests by
providing optimal care and undivided loyalty [45]. This
therapeutic orientation is central to medicine and other
health professions because patients are vulnerable and cli-
nicians have the expertise, knowledge, and skill to provide
the protection and assistance patients require. When clini-
cians become investigators, clinicians do not relinquish
their obligations to provide optimal medical care to their
patients. Patients who become research subjects still
retain their right to receive optimal care and undivided
loyalty. When the role of investigator conflicts with the
role of clinician, investigators should honor their roles as
clinicians. Scientific considerations should not be allowed
to take precedence over the good of the patient/subject.
Following Fried, other writers restated and refined the
notion of equipoise [2-4,46-48]. The Helsinki Declaration
codified the placebo orthodoxy that emerged from the
equipoise debate. The 1989 version of the document
implied that placebos should not be used in RCTs if there
is already a proven effective therapy: "In any medical
study, every patient--including those of a control group, if
any--should be assured of the best proven diagnostic and
therapeutic method" [49]. This language was later modi-
fied to allow for the use of placebos when there is a proven
effective therapy and patients will not be seriously or irre-
versibly harmed if they do not receive it [41].
During the 1990s, commentators continued to explore
the ethical issues in RCTs without seriously questioning or
explicitly justifying the fiduciary approach to the investi-
gator-subject relationship or the doctrine of equipoise.
Lurie and Wolfe, for example, published an article in the
New England Journal of Medicine in which they argued that
placebo-controlled RCTs to reduce the perinatal (mother-
child) transmission of the human immunodeficiency
virus (HIV) being conducted in developing nations were
unethical, because they violated the Council of Interna-
tional Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) guide-
lines, since a treatment had been proven effective for
preventing perinatal transmission of HIV [50,51]. Though
Lurie and Wolfe's article generated considerable press cov-
erage, it lacked philosophical depth, because it did not
offer a clear justification for following the CIOMS guide-
lines. However, the article initiated a great deal of schol-
arly discussion, and by the end of the decade, many
writers began to take a closer look at the doctrine of equi-
poise and the fiduciary view.
Critiques of the fiduciary approach
Informed consent
The first critique of the fiduciary approach was anticipated
by Hellman and Hellman as a potential objection to their
analysis of the ethics of RCTs [3]. According to this cri-
tique, investigators do not need to provide patients/sub-
jects with optimal care, provided that patients/subjects
consent to receive the care available under the study pro-
tocol and understand that they are participating in
research. Clinical research need not compromise the
patient's rights because the patient can waive some rights
when consenting research participation. A violation of a
right does not occur when one waives a right [52].
Informed consent permits scientific considerations to take
precedence over promoting the interests of the patient/
subject [43].Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:16 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/16
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One of the triumphs of the patient's rights movement is
the ethical and legal right to choose treatment [29,53,54].
In the early 1970s, legal decisions undercut paternalistic
medical traditions as competent patients won the right to
select different treatment options, including the option of
no treatment at all. The patient's right to choose also
applies to the research context. During the informed con-
sent process patients/subjects are explicitly told that they
are being invited to participate in research, and they are
informed about the alternatives to participating in
research, such as receiving standard medical care [43].
Patients/subjects are informed about the risks of the study
as well as potential benefits (if any), the purpose of the
study, the length of the study, and so on [43].
Even though patients/subjects can agree not to receive
optimal care, this does not mean that they may thereby be
placed unduly at risk. Various laws and regulations protect
research subjects from excessive risks [55,56]. All clinical
trials also have inclusion and exclusion criteria, which are
designed to protect patients from harm and meet the sci-
entific objectives of the trial. Once a patient/subject
enrolls in a trial, he or she will receive careful monitoring.
He/she may be withdrawn from a trial to protect him or
her from harm. After the trial is completed, investigators
will continue to follow patients/subjects to monitor their
health and protect them from harm [57].
One of the weaknesses of this critique of the fiduciary
view is that informed consent in research is often far from
perfect. If patients/subjects do not provide adequate con-
sent to research participation, then they cannot waive
their right to receive optimal care. A growing body of lit-
erature has demonstrated many different problems with
the consent process in clinical research. Subjects often
have difficulty understanding risks and benefits, the pro-
tocol design, the purpose of the research, and other crucial
pieces of information [58]. Patients also often have diffi-
culty making intelligent choices due to the effects of ill-
ness, psychological or emotional problems,
socioeconomic circumstances, linguistic or cultural barri-
ers, and so on [59]. Investigators often do not take enough
time to explain their to the research and often view
informed consent as a piece of paper that needs to be
signed, rather than a process of communication [52].
The therapeutic misconception, i.e. the mistaken belief
that clinical research studies are designed solely to pro-
mote the patient's welfare, can also undermine the con-
sent process. The therapeutic misconception can affect
many different aspects of the subject's thought processes.
Patients/subjects who are under the influence of the ther-
apeutic misconception tend to overestimate the potential
benefits of research and underestimate risks. The thera-
peutic misconception is difficult to dispel, even when
patients/subjects receive ample information about
research and are well-educated, because many patients
enter clinical studies hoping to find a cure for their disease
[43,60].
Although there are problems with informed consent in
clinical research, they do not undermine this critique of
the fiduciary view, because consent often is valid and
patients can often legitimately waive their right to receive
optimal care. However, these problems underscore the
importance of taking appropriate steps to obtain valid
consent. Investigators must make sure that patients (or
their representatives) have adequate decision-making
capacity, receive the information they need to make a
decision, understand the information, and are not facing
any conditions (such as coercion or duress) that could
interfere with their ability to make a free choice [55].
Investigators should also understand the social, psycho-
logical, and economic factors that can compromise con-
sent and take appropriate measures to promote effective
decision-making.
The difference thesis
The most prolific critic of the fiduciary view has been
Miller, who has published numerous articles on the sub-
ject with various coauthors [6,7,11,16,17,61]. Miller's
chief criticism of the fiduciary view, known as the differ-
ence thesis, holds that the ethics of clinical research is dif-
ferent from the ethics of clinical practice. Clinical
investigators are not bound by the same ethical obliga-
tions as clinicians who are not investigators [6]. In partic-
ular, clinical investigators do not have a duty to provide
patients/subjects with optimal care.
The  Belmont Report's distinction between research and
practice, discussed earlier, serves as a key premise in the
argument for the difference thesis. Clinical research and
clinical practice have different ethical standards because
they have different goals and methods. Clinical research is
scientific in orientation, while clinical practice is thera-
peutic in orientation. In clinical research, tests and treat-
ments must be administered according to a standardized
protocol, so that variables can be controlled and generali-
zations can be drawn from the data. In clinical practice,
the physician does not need to follow a rigid protocol and
can offer individualized medical care to fit the patient's
particular medical needs. In clinical research, a patient/
subject may undergo tests and procedures designed to col-
lect useful information, not to benefit him or her. In clin-
ical practice, the patient should only undergo tests and
procedures needed for diagnosis or treatment. In clinical
research, the patient's treatment plan may be selected at
random from two or more options. In clinical practice, the
patient and physician choose a treatment plan that meets
the patient's needs.Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:16 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/16
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The difference thesis has generated considerable discus-
sion and debate. Paul Miller and Charles Weijer challenge
Miller's attempt to draw inferences about the ethics of
clinical research from an account of the goals of clinical
research on the grounds that the connection between
goals of a practice and its ethical norms is indeterminate
[48,61]. It is an empirical question which approach to the
investigator-subject relationship (fiduciary or non-fiduci-
ary) is better at developing scientific knowledge. Though
there is some evidence that the non-fiduciary approach
helps to advance the goal of clinical research, it may also
produce some adverse effects that detract from the pursuit
of those goals, such as distrust of clinical researchers. In
any case, Miller needs to produce more evidence that con-
nects the goal of clinical research to the ethics of clinical
research [62].
Another objection to the difference thesis is that it is too
radical: though there may be some ethical differences
between clinical research and clinical practice, claiming
that these activities have totally different standards is an
exaggeration that threatens the welfare of patients/sub-
jects and the public's support of the research enterprise
[13,15,61]. Clinical researchers are still bound by many of
the same ethical duties that apply to clinical practice, such
as protecting patients/subjects from harm, maintaining
confidentiality, and even beneficence. One reason why
the ethical standards of clinical research may not differ
radically from those of clinical practice is that clinical
research may have other goals besides the development of
scientific knowledge, such as caring for patients, improv-
ing public health, and so on [61]. The ethical standards of
clinical research should also support these other goals,
not just the goal of pursuing scientific knowledge.
Putting these two objections together, one can conclude
that the most radical versions of the difference thesis are
indefensible, given our understanding of the goals of clin-
ical research and their relationships to ethical standards.
However, more modest versions of the thesis are plausi-
ble. One could argue that the there are important differ-
ences between the ethics of clinical practice and the ethics
of clinical research, even though there are also some sim-
ilarities. These differences are sufficient to call into ques-
tion the fiduciary view even if they do not justify
abandoning clinical obligations to patients/subjects
beyond those outlined in the protocol or those needed to
protect patients/subjects from harm.
Social goals vs. the patient's interests
The third challenge to the fiduciary view claims that ethics
does not demand that the physician always provide the
patient with optimal care because it is sometimes accept-
able to sacrifice the patient's interests to achieve impor-
tant social goals. For example, in medical education and
training, patients sometimes receive suboptimal care so
that medical and nursing students, interns, and others can
learn, thus benefitting future patients. When a supervising
physician asks a medical student to perform a rectal exam-
ination, the patient's interests may be partially sacrificed
for the sake of other people, because the student is not as
experienced as the supervising physician [15]. Although
medical training usually does not place patients at signif-
icant risk of harm, they may be inconvenienced in order
to help students learn.
Triage during disasters is another example of sacrificing
the patient's interests to achieve important social goals.
When there are not enough medical resources to help eve-
ryone, people who need medical aid urgently may be
treated before those who do not need aid urgently and
those who are so severely injured that medical aid is futile.
Triage runs counter to the Hippocratic tradition of putting
the patient first, since it requires health care professionals
to consider how to best help the most patients [63].
A potential problem with the social goals challenge to the
fiduciary view is that it embodies a utilitarian rationale
that could be used to justify unethical practices, such as
conducting studies on people without their consent,
exposing people to excessive risks, exploiting vulnerable
subjects, and so on [35,36]. To avoid these undesirable
implications, it is important to set some limits on the sac-
rifices that patients/subjects may be required to make for
medical research. For example, risks must be minimized,
informed consent must be obtained, vulnerable subjects
must be protected, and so on [56]. Although the social
goals critique must be properly qualified, it still presents a
significant challenge to the fiduciary view. It is reasonable
to suppose that the social goals promoted by research may
sometimes take precedence over the interests of the
patient/subject, provided that appropriate protections are
in place.
Alternatives to the fiduciary approach
Each of these critiques reveal significant flaws with the
fiduciary view, and, taken together, they show that the
fiduciary view, is untenable.c Investigators do not always
need to provide patients/subjects with optimal care, and
they may sometimes allow scientific considerations to
take precedence over the interests of the patient/subject,
provided that other safeguards are maintained, such as
informed consent and risk minimization. If the fiduciary
approach of the investigator-subject relationship is
flawed, what should take its place? I will now discuss two
alternatives.
The non-exploitation approach
Miller and colleagues have developed an account of the
investigator-subject relationship dubbed the non-exploi-Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:16 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/16
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tation view. The main argument for this position is the
difference thesis, discussed above. Because the goal of
research is to develop knowledge, not to benefit the
patient, clinical investigators are not required to provide
subjects with optimal care. Their main ethical obligation
is to avoid exploiting human subjects [6,7]. Non-exploita-
tion should be a guiding principle in research ethics
because most of the existing laws and guidelines were
developed, in part, to prevent exploitation of human sub-
jects in research and the worst abuses of human subjects
have involved exploitation [16]. One implication of this
approach is that the doctrine of equipoise is incoherent
and should be abandoned, because equipoise is founded
on the notion that investigators have a duty to provide
optimal care to the patient [16]. Placebo-controlled RCTs
should be allowed when they are supported by sound
methodology and do not expose human subjects to exces-
sive risks [6,7].
There are two significant problems with the non-exploita-
tion view, however. The first is that Miller and colleagues
have not provided an adequate account of exploitation in
biomedical research. In one of their early discussions of
the non-exploitation view, Miller and Brody said that
patients/subjects are not exploited if they are not exposed
to excessive risks and if they understand that they are par-
ticipating in research and not receiving "personalized care
directed at their best interest" [[6] at p. 5]. Miller and
Brody later added that seven ethical principles of clinical
research ethics defended by Emanuel and colleagues [56]
provide a framework for protecting research subjects from
exploitation [7]. Recently, Miller and Brody acknowl-
edged that their account of exploitation is underdevel-
oped [16].
If the exploitation were straightforward and uncontrover-
sial, then the failure to fully articulate a notion of exploi-
tation would not be a major weakness of the non-
exploitation view. However, exploitation is complex and
controversial. There are a variety of different accounts of
exploitation in the literature, ranging from Marxist theo-
ries to free-market approaches [64]. Moreover, the rela-
tionship between providing medical benefits and
avoiding exploitation in clinical research is hotly con-
tested [65]. Some authors argue that to avoid exploitation
in developing countries investigators must provide medi-
cal benefits to the subjects and address underlying injus-
tices in the host community or country, while others argue
that investigators can avoid exploitation by providing
subjects and the community or country with a fair share
of the benefits of research [66,67]d.
The second problem with the non-exploitation approach
is that proponents of this view have not clearly stated how
much clinical care investigators owe patients/subjects. At
times, the authors suggest that investigators have no
duties to provide patients/subjects with clinical care
beyond what is required to achieve the scientific aims of
the study. For example, Miller and Brody state that "clini-
cal research...is not a therapeutic activity devoted to the
personal care of patient" [[7] at p. 21]. But Miller and
Rosenstein also observe that "physician-investigators have
a responsibility to provide appropriate medical attention
and care at the same time that they engage in scientific
investigation" [[68] at p. 1385] and Miller and Brody
admit that "a physician-investigator has an obligation to
maximize therapeutic benefits to the patient-subject, pro-
vided that this benefit can be attained within the scientific
constraints imposed by the protocol" [[16] at p. 163] So
how much clinical care do investigators owe patients/sub-
jects? It is difficult to pin Miller and colleagues down on
this issue [61]. All that can be said with confidence is that
they believe that investigators do not need to provide
patients/subjects with optimal care.
It is important to have a clear understanding of how much
clinical care investigators owe to patients/subjects, since
this is the critical issue in the debates about RCTs, pla-
cebo-controls, drug washout periods, and other issues
related to the investigator-subject relationship. All com-
mentators on these topics agree that clinical investigators
must provide patients/subjects with the clinical care
described in the protocol as well as the care needed to pro-
tect patients/subjects from harm. But what should they do
for patients/subjects beyond this minimal standard? That
is the crux is the matter.
The partial entrustment approach
Richardson and Belsky develop an alternative to the fidu-
ciary view that attempts to deal with the question concern-
ing the extent of the clinical investigator's obligation to
provide the patient/subject with clinical care. The authors
reject the extreme view that investigators have no duty to
provide patients/subjects with medical benefits beyond
what is required by the protocol, arguing that there are
two sources of justification for investigators' therapeutic
obligations. First, all moral agents have a duty of rescue,
i.e. the obligation to make a reasonable effort to help a
person who is endangered[9]. The duty of rescue is differ-
ent from a duty to avoid causing harm to other people,
since it is a positive duty to aid someone. Various moral
theories, including Kantianism, utilitarianism, and social
contract theory, support a duty to help others, which
implies a duty of rescue [53].
Second, investigators have special moral obligations
beyond the duty of rescue as a result of their relationships
to patients/subjects. Because investigators have considera-
ble discretion to make decisions that affect the welfare of
patients/subjects and because patients/subjects are vul-Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:16 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/16
Page 7 of 15
(page number not for citation purposes)
nerable, investigators are partially entrusted to promote
the welfare of patients/subjects. Richardson and Belsky
call their view a "partial entrustment" approach to distin-
guish it from the fiduciary view, which involves complete
entrustment [9]. Richardson and Belsky argue that the
relationship between the investigator and patient/subject
is similar to a legal relationship known as a bailment. In a
bailment, the entrusted person, the bailee, agrees to take
care of an item owned by another person, the bailor, and
return it undamaged. For example, in valet parking, the
company has a responsibility prevent the car from being
damaged while under its care and to return the car to the
owner in good condition [69].
Richardson and Belsky describe some factors that deter-
mine the extent of the investigator's clinical responsibili-
ties to human subjects, including the nature of the
research, the investigator's resources, the subjects' vulner-
abilities, and what the subjects have consented to. For
example, an investigator who is conducting research on
highly vulnerable subjects, such as patients with cognitive
impairments, would have greater responsibilities to the
subjects than an investigator who is conducting research
on subjects who are not as vulnerable, such as healthy vol-
unteers donating biological materials to a biobank. An
investigator who is conducting a Phase III oncology clini-
cal trial would have greater responsibilities than an inves-
tigator who is collecting blood and tissue for a biobank,
because the oncology investigator has more discretion
than the biobank investigator [9].
Richardson and Belsky apply their analysis to a case
involving ancillary care, i.e. care that a clinical investigator
may offer to a research subject that is not required by the
scientific aims of the study. The authors argue that inves-
tigators who are studying malaria in children living in an
area of Africa where the disease is endemic have a respon-
sibility to diagnose and treat schistosomiasis, a parasitic
disease caused by flatworms, which is likely to be found
in up to 10 percent of subjects. Diagnosing schistosomia-
sis is within the investigator's discretion because the dis-
ease is easily detectable in urine samples drawn for the
study and up to 10 percent of children are likely to have
the disease. Additional factors in favor of diagnosing and
treating the patients/subjects include their high degree of
vulnerability and the investigators' ample resources. How-
ever, if the prevalence of the disease were 90 percent, this
would greatly weaken the obligations to treat the disease,
because this would put an enormous burden on the
research team's budget, which could make it difficult to
conduct the study, according to the authors [9].
Richardson and Belsky's analysis of the investigator-sub-
ject relationship is insightful, sophisticated, and well-rea-
soned. In my judgment, it is the best model of the
investigator-subject relationship proposed thus far. It
embraces the widely accepted idea that investigators have
some responsibilities to provide clinical care to patients/
subjects beyond what is required by the protocol or is nec-
essary to protect patients/subjects from harm, but it also
specifies conditions for delineating those responsibilities.
However, the partial entrustment model has some flaws
as well.
First, the notion of a partial entrustment is morally unsta-
ble, because it may easily degenerate into no entrustment
if the party who is partially entrusted attempts to limit
entrustment via legal maneuvers. For example, businesses
often try to avoid legal responsibilities by posting warn-
ings, such as "not responsible for lost or stolen goods,"
"no lifeguard on duty; swim at your own risk," etc. People
who read signs like these are likely to wonder whether the
business can be trusted at all. Likewise, investigators may
attempt to limit entrustment through consent process,
which would tend to make patients/subjects wonder how
much the investigator can be trusted. Complete entrust-
ments cannot be easily disavowed, but partial entrust-
ments can be. The notion of "partial entrustment," like
the notion of a "half-truth," invites skepticism and suspi-
cion, and is not a sound foundation for investigator-sub-
ject relationship.
Second, the legal concept of bailment cited by the authors
as an example of a partial entrustment typically does not
involve significant beneficence obligations on the part of
the bailee toward the bailor [69]. A valet parking company
has an obligation to protect the vehicle from damage, but
it need not take any steps to improve the vehicle, such as
changing the oil or replacing the muffler, unless is has spe-
cifically agreed to do so. This is very different from the
example of ancillary care mentioned by Richardson and
Belsky. A researcher who provides ancillary care is like the
valet parking company that also changes the oil and
replaces mufflers.
Third, there are factors that affect the investigator's obliga-
tions to the subject that Richardson and Belsky do not
consider in adequate depth, such as the investigator's
expertise. On the one hand, an investigator cannot be
expected to provide a benefit that he/she is not qualified
to deliver, no how matter vulnerable the patient is or how
many funds the investigator has available. For example, a
neuroscientist who sees an image that appears to be a
tumor on an MRI scan is not qualified to make a diagno-
sis, though a radiologist would be. On the other hand, if
an investigator has sufficient expertise to provide a bene-
fit, then he/she may be obligated to provide it. For exam-
ple, a radiologist who reads an MRI scan as part of a
research study would have a duty to determine whether an
image on the scan is likely to be a tumor.Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:16 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/16
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In sum, while these two alternatives to the fiduciary view
have redeeming features, they also have some flaws. There
is a need, therefore, to develop a better alternative to the
fiduciary view, which will be my main concern in the
remainder of this essay.
The contextual approach
The approach I will present builds on Richardson and Bel-
sky's key insight that the investigator's obligation to pro-
vide clinical care can vary from one situation to the next.
Many commentators have tried to resolve the conflict
between the investigator's clinical and scientific roles by
siding with one role or the other. The fiduciary view tips
the scales in favor of the clinical role over the scientific
one, while the non-exploitation view tips the scales in the
other direction. Though these two polar views are fairly
simple and easy to understand, the correct view, I shall
argue, is more nuanced than either of these. The balance
can shift from one role to the other, depending on the
context. In some situations, the role of the clinician
should dominate; in others, the role of investigator
should dominate. And there are many variations in
between.
To generate some intuitive support for a contextual
approach, consider the wide variety of activities that are
classified as clinical research. Clinical research includes:
Phase I, II, III, and IV clinical trials; environmental expo-
sure studies; genetic research; epidemiological research,
public health research, behavioral studies; and case
reports [57,70]. If ethical obligations depend, at least in
part, on factors inherent in the particular situation [53], it
is reasonable to suppose that the investigator's ethical
obligations to the patient/subject may be different in
these different types of research. It seems plausible that
the obligations of an investigator conducting a Phase I
drug safety study on healthy volunteers are different from
those of an investigator conducting a Phase III drug clini-
cal trial on patients with a disease.
While the idea that obligations to the patient/subject may
be different in different situations has intuitive appeal, it
requires a philosophical foundation, so that we have a
clearer account of the investigators' obligations to the
patient/subject. To develop the conceptual underpinnings
of the contextual approach, I will make a few comments
about institutional (or role) morality.e
In society, people have general ethical obligations as well
special obligations associated with particular institutions,
such as business, government, medicine, science, mar-
riage, family, and so on [71,72]. General, ethical obliga-
tions apply to all people who are capable of following
moral rules (i.e. moral agents), but institutional obliga-
tions, apply only to people who occupy specific roles in
those institutions. The justification for institutional
morality is twofold: first, institutional ethical standards
must help to promote the goals of the institution; and sec-
ond, the institution itself must be morally worthwhile
[73]. For example, confidentiality is ethically justified in
medicine because it promotes doctor-patient trust, which
is necessary for effective diagnosis and treatment; further,
medicine is a worthwhile social institution [53]. Secrecy
in organized crime is not justified because organized
crime is an immoral activity.
Very often, people can avoid conflicts of institutional obli-
gations through prudent decision-making and planning.
When conflicts cannot be avoided, one must decide which
obligation should have priority by considering the cir-
cumstances (i.e. contextual factors) and options, in light
of ethical theories or principles [74]. Suppose that a man,
John, is a volunteer firefighter. He also has a 12-year-old
son who is studying the piano. His son has a recital at the
same time the firefighters have an organizational meeting,
which cannot be changed. John decides to go to the recital
and skip the meeting. He knows that his son will be
greatly disappointed if he misses the recital, and he is not
needed at the meeting. If the circumstances were different,
John would be justified in deciding to forego the recital.
For example, if John is needed to help fight a fire at a hard-
ware store just before his son's recital, John would decide
to give priority to his obligations as a firefighter, since
many people could be harmed if the fire is not controlled.
We can apply the insights from these simple examples to
more complicated ones involving science and medicine.
Very often clinical investigators can fulfill their different
institutional roles without having to deal with any con-
flicts. When unavoidable conflicts occur between different
institutional obligations, as is the often the case in RCTs,
the clinical investigator must decide which obligation
should have priority. To deal with conflicting institutional
obligations, the investigator should consider the circum-
stances (or context) of the research, available options, and
ethical principles or norms, such as risk minimization,
informed consent, protection of vulnerable subjects, etc.
The circumstances can have a profound impact on deci-
sion-making, as they can make the difference between
favoring one role over another. The following contextual
factors, some of which have been mentioned previously,
are relevant to balancing clinical and scientific obliga-
tions:
•  The research design. Research design can affect
many contextual factors, such as benefits and risks.
Key elements of the design include the methods and
procedures, inclusion and exclusion criteria, and data
and safety monitoring plans. Sometimes it may be
possible to alter the study design to reduce risks orPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:16 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/16
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increase benefits without adversely affecting the likeli-
hood of achieving the aims and objectives of the
study. For example, a study might be changed from a
placebo control group design to an active control
group design, which could potentially increase bene-
fits to the subjects [5,75].
￿ Benefits and risks. In general, the investigator's clin-
ical role increases as the medical or psychological risks
to the subject increase, because the investigator must
take additional steps to protect the subject from these
risks. The level of risk may also have an impact on the
expertise that is required of the investigator. For exam-
ple, if a study includes a bronchoscopy, an appropri-
ately trained physician should perform this procedure.
The potential social benefits of the research may also
impact the investigator's clinical obligations. As noted
earlier, the patient's interests can sometimes be par-
tially sacrificed for research that is likely to achieve
important social goals, provided that other protec-
tions are in place. Many writers argued, for example,
that the use of placebos was justified in the clinical tri-
als criticized by Lurie and Wolfe, because one of the
main goals of the research was to develop an afforda-
ble method for preventing the perinatal transmission
of HIV in developing nations, which could save thou-
sands of lives [76].
￿ The patient/subject's reasonable expectations. The
patient/subject's reasonable expectations need to be
considered to maintain the patient/subject's trust,
which is essential to both clinical research and clinical
medicine [43,56]. Reasonable expectations are explic-
itly addressed during the informed consent process,
but one must also consider the patient/subject's
assumptions about the research. For example, if the
patient is desperately ill and views research participa-
tion as her best hope, she would probably regard
research as potentially therapeutic [55]. Although
investigators should not perpetuate the therapeutic
misconception, they need to be aware of the patient/
subject's expectations concerning potential medical
benefits.
￿  The patient/subject's vulnerability. The patient/
subject's vulnerability can affect his or her ability to
consent to research participation and to promote his
or her own interests [59]. People who are highly vul-
nerable may have greater medical, psychological, and
economic needs than people who are not as vulnera-
ble and require additional protection from risks
related to research participation [9,77]. One could
also argue that principles of justice demand that inves-
tigators give special attention to protecting and caring
for those most in need of help [42,78].
￿ The patients/subjects motivations. Some commen-
tators have argued that the patient/subject's motiva-
tions can make a difference in the ethics of research.
For example, someone who enrolls in a study for altru-
istic motives may be more willing to forego medical
treatment than someone who enrolls in a study for
personal benefit [79]. While motivations can have an
important bearing on the investigator-subject relation-
ship, they can be very difficult to assess. People may
espouse altruistic motives but still be interested in
receiving medical benefits.
￿ The investigator's ability to benefit the subject.
This factor has a significant impact on the investiga-
tor's obligations to provide medical care for the
patient/subject, since it is not reasonable to require
someone to do something they are not capable of
doing [80]. The investigator's ability to benefit the
subject is a function of several factors, including his or
her resources (discussed earlier), expertise (also men-
tioned earlier) and knowledge. Knowledge needs to
considered because there is no a duty to render aid to
a person if one does not know about that person's
needs or would not be reasonably expected to know
about them.
￿  The investigator's previous relationship to the
patient/subject. Though patients are often referred to
research studies by their primary care physicians,
sometimes investigators have prior relationships with
the potential research subjects they are recruiting. An
investigator who enrolls one of his or her own patients
into a study should not be able to easily shed obliga-
tions to benefit the patient, due to their prior relation-
ship. It may also be especially difficult for the patient
to grasp the idea that the purpose of the study is to
obtain generalizable knowledge, not to benefit him or
her, when the patient already has a therapeutic rela-
tionship with the investigator [9]. Under these circum-
stances, investigators must be especially wary of the
therapeutic misconception and the patient's expecta-
tions to receive medical care [60].
These seven contextual factors--and possibly more--play
an important role in deciding how to settle conflicts
between an investigator's scientific and clinical obliga-
tions. I will now illustrate this point by examining differ-
ent types of clinical research (see Figure 1).
Applications
Epidemiologic research
Epidemiologic studies involve the observation of human
subjects in their natural environment, without the provi-
sion of medical treatment or any other controlled inter-
vention. Some common epidemiologic research methodsPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:16 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/16
Page 10 of 15
(page number not for citation purposes)
include prospective cohort studies, retrospective case-con-
trol studies, and cross-sectional studies. Epidemiologists
may collect biological samples, and health and demo-
graphic information. The purpose of epidemiologic
research is not to test specific treatments, but to develop
general knowledge about the relationships between dis-
eases and causal factors, such as diet, lifestyle, environ-
mental exposures, and genetics [57].
A strong argument can be made that the investigator's
main role in epidemiologic research is scientific, not ther-
apeutic. First, epidemiologic studies usually involve min-
imal risks. In many studies, the biggest risk of research
participation will be potential loss of confidentiality or
bruising or infection from a blood draw [57]. Second,
since epidemiologic studies involve the collection of data
but not medical treatment, patients/subjects are not likely
to expect that they will receive medical care. Third, the
investigator's ability to help the patient/subject may be
quite limited, due to his or her lack of expertise, knowl-
edge, or resources. He or she may also not have access to
any data that could be useful in diagnosis or treatment.
The investigator may not even have access to information
that identifies the patient/subject, since many epidemio-
logic studies anonymize the data [57]. Fourth, the investi-
gator probably has no prior relationship with the patient/
subject. Epidemiologic studies are often conducted by
people who specialize in a particular discipline and are
not practicing medicine on the patients they are studying.
Although investigators have minimal obligations to pro-
vide clinical care in most epidemiologic studies, there are
some exceptions to this rule. Suppose an epidemiologist
is also a physician who is studying a population in a
developing nation and that he has been providing medi-
cal care to many of the people in the community. In these
circumstances, one could argue that he has some obliga-
tions to provide medical benefits to patients/subjects, pro-
vided that he has the resources to do so, because they are
vulnerable, he has the requisite expertise, and he has a
prior relationship with them. For example, if he is con-
ducting medical examinations or tests as part of his study,
he could make recommendations for medical treatment if
he discovers problems that warrant it, such as infectious
diseases.
Genetic research
Many types of clinical research studies examine the rela-
tionship between genes and diseases. Studies may attempt
to explore statistical relationships between patterns of
genetic variation and diseases, identify or sequence spe-
cific genes that increase the risk of developing diseases, or
investigate the causal pathways from genes to disease. In
these studies, investigators collect biological samples
(such as blood, buccal cells, or hair) from human subjects
and obtain information about their medical history, life-
style, and environmental exposures. The goal of the
genetic research is usually not to develop new medical
therapies but to gain a better understanding of the genetic
basis of health and disease, which may lead to new thera-
pies [57].
Like epidemiologic research, the investigator's main role
in genetic research is usually scientific, not therapeutic.
First, genetic research, like epidemiologic research, usually
involves minimal risks. Second, since patients/subjects are
not receiving therapy as part of the study design, they are
not likely to expect to receive therapy. Third, the investiga-
tor's ability to help patients/subjects may be quite limited,
due to lack of expertise, knowledge, or resources. The
investigator may be a geneticist with little or no back-
ground in the area clinical medicine that is relevant to
patients/subjects' needs, and the investigator may not
have access to clinically useful information about
patients/subjects. Like the epidemiologist, the geneticist
may not even have access to data that personally identifies
patients/subjects. Fourth, the genetic researcher, like the
epidemiologist, probably has no prior relationship with
the subjects.
Although researchers have minimal clinical duties in
genetic research, there are also some exceptions to this
Balancing Scientific and Clinical Roles Figure 1
Balancing Scientific and Clinical Roles.
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rule. If an investigator discovers some clinically useful
information about a research subject, such as a gene
strongly associated with a type of cancer, an argument can
be made that the investigator should share this informa-
tion with the subject and make an appropriate referral,
because the subject could benefit from receiving this
information, and it would not take too much effort to pro-
vide it [19,80]. However, the decision to share genetic
information with patients/subjects creates its own dilem-
mas, since the genetic tests may not be well-validated and
the meaning of the genetic information may not be well-
understood. Some investigators inform patients/subjects
up front that they will not provide them with the results
of any genetic tests, so they can avoid the dilemma of
whether (and how) to inform patients about these results
[81].
Investigators who combine genetic studies with other
types of research, such as clinical trials, may also have
extensive clinical obligations. For example, in pharmaco-
genetics research investigators attempt to understand how
genetic variations affect drug absorption, transport,
removal, metabolism, etc [82]. An investigator who is
conducting a Phase III clinical trial that aims to determine
whether there are genetic factors related to how patients/
subjects respond to a diabetes medication would have
clinical responsibilities similar to another investigator
conducting a Phase III study (for more on clinical trials,
see below).
Phase I trials
Phase I is the first stage in human testing for new treat-
ments, such as drugs, biologics, and medical devices.
Phase I trials are designed to obtain data pertaining to
safety, not efficacy. They are usually conducted on healthy
volunteers, though some Phase I studies are conducted on
patients with advanced cancer or other diseases, who may
be able to benefit from receiving the treatment. Phase I
studies are usually small (20-100 subjects) and have a
short duration (a few months). Phase I studies are usually
conducted in a clinical setting, such as medical center or
hospital, so that investigators will have the resources nec-
essary to monitor research subjects and provide emer-
gency medical care, if necessary. Subjects are usually paid
a considerable sum of money for their participation [83].
A strong case can be made that the clinical investigator's
primary role in a Phase I trial in healthy volunteers is sci-
entific, not therapeutic, even though he or she has more
clinical responsibilities than someone conducting epide-
miologic research. First, healthy volunteers probably do
not expect to receive any medical benefits. They are likely
to view their participation as a way to earn some money
and help advance scientific research, not as a means of
obtaining therapy [84]. Second, though the subjects may
be somewhat vulnerable, due to their socioeconomic cir-
cumstances, they are probably not highly vulnerable.
Phase I studies on healthy volunteers are usually con-
ducted on adults without significant cognitive impair-
ments [83]. Third, the clinical investigators usually have
no prior therapeutic relationships with the subjects. Clin-
ical investigators conducting Phase I studies on healthy
volunteers are, for the most part, researchers studying the
adverse effects of treatments in people, not clinicians who
are helping to advance medical science. Fourth, since
Phase I studies often involve significant risks to human
subjects, investigators do have clinical responsibilities
related to protecting subjects from harm, such as careful
monitoring, provision of emergency medical treatment,
and so on. Investigators in Phase I studies must also have
the appropriate expertise to conduct studies that induce
toxicity in patients/subjects.
The circumstances are much different when a Phase I trial
involves patients with diseases. First, although Phase I
studies on patients are designed to test safety, not efficacy,
there is often a small chance (5% or less) that patients
may benefit from their participation, and it may some-
times be possible to alter the study design to maximize
potential benefits[85]. Second, diseased Phase I patients/
subjects may expect to receive medical benefits from their
participation. Research shows that patients in Phase I
oncology trials often expect to benefit from their partici-
pation even when they are explicitly told that they are not
likely to [85]. Third, subjects are usually highly vulnera-
ble, due to their illness. Subjects in these trials are usually
very sick and view participation in research as their last
hope [85]. Fourth, the clinical investigators may have a
prior relationship with the patients/subjects. For example,
an investigator may be an oncologist who has been treat-
ing a patient, who suggests that the patient consider par-
ticipating in a clinical trial when the present treatment is
no longer beneficial. Fifth, investigators probably have the
knowledge and expertise necessary to provide the patients
with medical benefits beyond what is required by the
study, though their resources may be limited.
Phase II & III trials
After a new treatment has completed Phase I testing,
Phase II testing may begin. During this stage, the drug is
administered to patients with a disease that the drug is
intended to treat, and data are collected regarding the
drug's efficacy and safety. Phase II studies typically include
100-300 patients and may last up to two years. Patients
are randomly assigned to receive the new drug, an effec-
tive therapy, or a placebo, depending on the study design.
Investigators take various steps to minimize risks to sub-
jects, such as excluding people who may be too ill to ben-
efit from the drug and periodically reviewing participants'
clinical data. A Phase II trial may be stopped if a drug isPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:16 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/16
Page 12 of 15
(page number not for citation purposes)
too dangerous or ineffective. If a drug has proven to be
safe and effective in Phase II testing, a larger, Phase III
study may be initiated. Phase III studies may include
many thousands of patients and last for many years [70].
Subjects in Phase II and III studies are usually provided
with treatment at no cost and they may or may not be
paid. A product that successfully completes Phase III test-
ing may be submitted for regulatory approval [57].
One could argue that the investigator's obligations to pro-
vide patients/subjects with optimal care are stronger in
Phase II and III trials than in Phase I trials. First, the
patients/subjects in Phase II or III are more likely to view
their participation as a form of therapy than patients/sub-
jects in Phase I, because they may be receiving some form
of treatment as part of their participation. Second, the
patients/subjects may be vulnerable in Phase II and III
studies, due to their illness. Third, investigators usually
have the expertise and knowledge to offer patients/sub-
jects clinical care beyond what is required by the protocol.
Fourth, investigators may have prior relationships with
the patients/subjects. For example, an investigator might
be an infectious disease specialist who presents his
patients with an opportunity to enroll in a research study
that might benefit them. They often enroll patients in
research studies while simultaneously providing routine
care.
As mentioned previously, using placebo control groups
presents a difficult challenge for balancing clinical and sci-
entific roles in Phase II and III studies. It is important to
note that virtually all commentators agree on two points.
First, placebo controls are acceptable when there is no
effective treatment for the disease under investigation,
because this would not deny patients any medical bene-
fits. Second, placebos should never be given to a human
subject when this is likely to cause serious or irreversible
harm, since investigators have a duty to minimize risks to
subjects. For example, it would be unethical to give a pla-
cebo to someone with diabetes who is currently taking
insulin to control his blood sugar levels, as the subject
could become severely ill and possibly die if he stops tak-
ing his medication. Likewise, some have argued it would
be unethical to give placebos to patients who are taking
anti-psychotic drugs to control their condition, as this
could cause a relapse of their illness and lead to suicide or
homicide [86].
The most controversial questions concerning placebos
involve situations in which there is an effective treatment,
but giving patients/subjects a placebo will not cause seri-
ous or irreversible harm, because they are not currently
taking the treatment, due to their socioeconomic circum-
stances. The fiduciary approach holds that it would be
unethical to enroll a patient in study when there is an
effective treatment, since the investigator has an obliga-
tion to provide the patient with optimal care. The non-
exploitation view holds that it would be ethical to enroll
a patient under these conditions, provided that exploita-
tion is avoided. According to the approach I am propos-
ing, the ethics of the study would depend on resolving
several contextual issues. First, could the study design be
altered so that an active control group is used instead of a
placebo, without impacting the validity or clarity of the
results? There is an ongoing dispute as to whether pla-
cebo-controls are always necessary to achieve scientific
aims [75]. Second, would it be reasonable for the subjects
to expect to receive medical treatment? Do they under-
stand that they may not benefit from participating in the
study? Third, are the subjects vulnerable? How does their
vulnerability impact their decision-making? Fourth, does
the investigator have the ability to help the subjects? Are
there sufficient resources to conduct a trial in which the
control group receives an effective treatment? Fifth, does
the investigator have a prior relationship with the sub-
jects? Finally, what is the social value of the study? Does
the value of the study justify using placebo controls? The
answers to these and other questions concerning the cir-
cumstances of the research can help determine whether
placebo control groups are acceptable.
One reason why the HIV trials criticized by Lurie and
Wolfe were so controversial is that some of the contextual
factors were disputed and others pulled in opposite direc-
tions. The issue most disputed was whether the aims of
the research could have been achieved with active con-
trols. Critics, such as Lurie and Wolfe [50], argued that
placebo-controls were unnecessary, while proponents,
such as Varmus and Satcher [87], countered that placebo
controls were necessary. Critics and proponents of the
studies agreed that the research had a socially valuable
objective--to develop an affordable treatment for prevent-
ing the perinatal transmission of HIV--but they did not
agree that pursuit of this objective could justify giving
some subjects a placebo [76].
Phase IV (post-marketing studies)
Phase IV trials occur after a product has been approved for
distribution and marketing. During this phase, the manu-
facturer may gather additional data on the product's safety
and efficacy on tens of thousands of people and compare
it to other treatments. Information is also obtained on the
long-term effects of the product and its impact on quality
of life. The product may be tested in populations that were
not included in Phase II and III studies. Phase IV studies
often do not use some of the methods used in Phase II and
III, such as control groups, randomization, or blinding
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One could argue that the shift from the scientific role to
the therapeutic role continues in Phase IV. First, by the
time a new therapy reaches Phase IV, it is no longer exper-
imental or untested. Hence, it is more likely to offer ben-
efits to patients/subjects. Second, since the methods used
in Phase IV studies are also often less rigorous than those
used in Phase II or III, the demeanor of a Phase IV may less
scientific than the demeanor of a Phase II or III study.
Third, the investigators are often clinicians gathering data
in their clinics, not academic scientists, so they are likely
to have prior relationships with their patients/subjects.
Case reports
The final type of research I will consider is the case report.
A case report involves the careful description of a case (or
series of cases) that a clinician has encountered in his or
her practice, such as a patient with rare disease, or unusual
symptoms, findings, treatment, or pathology. A clinician
who is planning to write a case report about a patient need
not significantly alter his or her practice for the sake of the
research, since the main goals are to diagnose and treat the
patient, and research goals are secondary. Additional data
or samples may be gathered for the case report, and a
patient may be asked to give permission for the use of his
photos or medical records, with identifying information
removed. Though case reports lack the rigor of clinical tri-
als or epidemiological studies, they can provide some use-
ful information for researchers and clinicians. Prestigious
journals, such as the New England Journal of Medicine and
the Journal of the American Medical Association regularly
publish case reports [57].
In case reports, the clinical role clearly dominates. First,
the treatment plan is tailored to meet the patient's specific
needs, not to test any scientific hypotheses. Second,
patients expect to receive medical treatment and are usu-
ally not altruistically motivated. Third, patients are often
vulnerable, due to illness or other factors. Fourth, the
investigators usually have the knowledge, expertise, and
resources to benefit the patients. Fifth, the benefits and
the risks to the patient receiving treatment may be high,
depending on his or her disease. Sixth, the investigator
often has a prior relationship with the patient before the
encounter that led to the case report.
Conclusion
To summarize, clinical investigators face a conflict
between institutional roles (clinician vs. scientist), which
can generate different ethical obligations. To deal with the
conflict, investigators should weigh and consider their
options in light of ethical theories and principles and the
contextual factors, such as the research design; benefits
and risks; the patient/subject's reasonable expectations,
motives, and vulnerability; their ability to help the
patient/subject; and their prior relationships with the
patient/subject. The investigator's obligation to provide
clinical care to the patient/subject can vary, depending on
the circumstances. In some situations, the clinical role
dominates, and the investigator has significant obliga-
tions to provide the patient/subject with medical benefits;
in other situations, the scientific role dominates, and the
investigator has minimal obligations to provide the
patient/subject with medical benefits. And there are many
variations on these patterns.
Before concluding this essay, I will address one objection
and make one comment about policy implications. First,
one might object that my contextual approach is a form of
moral relativism, since the investigator's ethical obliga-
tions may be different in different situations. Moral rela-
tivism in human subjects research is objectionable
because it can be used to justify abuses of human subjects
in the name of science and leads to inconsistency, i.e. dou-
ble-standards [88]. My response to this charge is that eth-
ics can be situational without being relativistic because
there are some universal standards that apply to different
situations [89]. These standards include some principles
discussed in this essay, such as minimizing risks and
obtaining informed consent, as well as others discussed
elsewhere, such as safeguarding confidentiality and pri-
vacy, independent review of research, and equitable selec-
tion of subjects [56]. To apply an ethical principle to a
particular situation, one must interpret the principle in
light of the facts at hand and balance the principle against
other ethical principles and considerations. This view is
not an "anything goes" form of relativism because the
same standards apply universally, even though they may
be interpreted and implemented differently. For example,
informed consent in an African village may be very differ-
ent from informed consent in Boston, MA, due to social,
cultural, and linguistic differences [56].
Second, earlier I stated that this essay addresses the ethical
duties of investigators, not their legal duties. However,
one could argue that my views have some implications for
the law. For instance, one could argue that judicial opin-
ions that examine the legal duties of clinical investigators
should consider the context of research, or that interpre-
tive guidance issued by regulatory agencies should address
contextual factors. I will not pursue that line of argument
here, but leave it for others to explore.
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Notes
a. By "clinical investigator" I mean a physician, nurse, pharmacist, physical 
therapist, psychologist or other health care professional who conducts 
research with human subjects. Though most of the discussion of the inves-
tigator-subject relationship focus on physicians, it is important to realize 
that many other health care professionals are involved in clinical research.
b. "Miller" refers to Frank Miller, unless otherwise indicated.
c. One might try to defend a modified version of the fiduciary view against 
these three critiques by maintaining that the investigator-subject relation-
ship is fiduciary in nature even though some fiduciary obligations, such as 
the duty to provide optimal care, can be limited in some circumstances, 
such as clinical trials. While I can see how this sort of retrenchment is con-
ceivable, I regard it as unappealing and ad hoc, since a modified fiduciary 
view might be indistinguishable from alternative views discussed in this 
essay, such as the partial entrustment approach or my own contextual 
approach.
d. This objection does not show that the non-exploitation view is flawed in 
principle, since Miller and colleagues could develop a satisfactory account 
of exploitation as part of their view. However, given the controversies sur-
rounding the concept of exploitation in the philosophical literature and in 
public discourse, I doubt whether they can do this.
e. A complete analysis of role morality is beyond the scope of this essay. In 
the main text, I have included references to fuller accounts of role morality.
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